AI Washing or Substantive Adoption? A Game-Theoretic Model of Corporate AI Disclosure under Investor Scrutiny and Regulatory Enforcement

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63646/RWGJ5521

Keywords:

AI washing, Corporate disclosure, Signaling game, Regulatory enforcement, Information asymmetry, AI adoption measurement, Textual analysis, Game theory

Abstract

Firms increasingly advertise their use of artificial intelligence (AI), and securities regulators have begun to sanction “AI washing”, that is, claims of AI capabilities that firms do not have. This study develops a game-theoretic model in which firms decide whether to adopt AI at a privately known cost and then choose between a substantive, verifiable AI claim and a vague one. Investors price firms on the basis of their disclosures, and a regulator audits substantive claims and sanctions false ones. Under the D1 refinement, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unique and moves through four regimes as the expected sanction rises: silence, pooling washing, partial washing, and truthful disclosure. Closed-form expressions are derived for the adoption rate, the share of firms making substantive claims, and the share of those claims that are false. Two results matter for business data analytics. First, in the partial-washing regime, measures that count substantive AI claims in corporate text overstate true adoption by a factor equal to the price stake of a claim divided by the expected sanction, and stronger enforcement raises true adoption while lowering measured claims. Second, the welfare-maximizing audit intensity is interior, has a closed form, and tolerates some washing; without commitment, the regulator does not audit and informative disclosure disappears. Numerical experiments, validated by an exhaustive equilibrium search and Monte Carlo simulation, show that the optimal policy raises adoption from 25% to 35% of firms and welfare by 7.0% relative to no enforcement, whereas full deterrence costs more than it gains. Sensitivity analysis and extensions to audit errors and sanction caps identify when these conclusions change.

How to Cite

Wu, C., & Wang, Z. (2026). AI Washing or Substantive Adoption? A Game-Theoretic Model of Corporate AI Disclosure under Investor Scrutiny and Regulatory Enforcement. Journal of Business and Data Analytics, 4(7), 25-39. https://doi.org/10.63646/RWGJ5521

References

Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., Hazell, J., & Restrepo, P. (2022). Artificial intelligence and jobs: Evidence from online vacancies. Journal of Labor Economics, 40(S1), S293–S340. https://doi.org/10.1086/718327

Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431

Babina, T., Fedyk, A., He, A., & Hodson, J. (2024). Artificial intelligence, firm growth, and product innovation. Journal of Financial Economics, 151, 103745. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103745

Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. https://doi.org/10.1086/259394

Bertomeu, J., & Marinovic, I. (2016). A theory of hard and soft information. The Accounting Review, 91(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51102

Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 296–343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003

Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., & Syverson, C. (2021). The productivity J-curve: How intangibles complement general purpose technologies. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 13(1), 333–372. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180386

Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987). Signaling games and stable equilibria. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 179–221. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885060

Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–1451. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390

Delmas, M. A., & Burbano, V. C. (2011). The drivers of greenwashing. California Management Review, 54(1), 64–87. https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2011.54.1.64

Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010). Quality disclosure and certification: Theory and practice. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(4), 935–963. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.48.4.935

Dye, R. A. (1985). Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting Research, 23(1), 123–145. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910

Fischer, P. E., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). Reporting bias. The Accounting Review, 75(2), 229–245. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2000.75.2.229

Gentzkow, M., Kelly, B., & Taddy, M. (2019). Text as data. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(3), 535–574. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181020

Grossman, S. J. (1981). The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. The Journal of Law and Economics, 24(3), 461–483. https://doi.org/10.1086/466995

Hassan, T. A., Hollander, S., van Lent, L., & Tahoun, A. (2019). Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(4), 2135–2202. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz021

Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1–3), 405–440. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00018-0

Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590–2615. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590

Kartik, N. (2009). Strategic communication with lying costs. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1359–1395. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00559.x

Kartik, N., Ottaviani, M., & Squintani, F. (2007). Credulity, lies, and costly talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1), 93–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003

Loughran, T., & McDonald, B. (2011). When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis, dictionaries, and 10-Ks. The Journal of Finance, 66(1), 35–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x

Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. (2011). Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure under threat of audit. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20(1), 3–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00282.x

Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y. (2016). Scrutiny, norms, and selective disclosure: A global study of greenwashing. Organization Science, 27(2), 483–504. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2015.1039

McElheran, K., Li, J. F., Brynjolfsson, E., Kroff, Z., Dinlersoz, E., Foster, L., & Zolas, N. (2024). AI adoption in America: Who, what, and where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12576

Milgrom, P. R. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380–391. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003562

Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000). The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 45–76. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.1.45

Seele, P., & Gatti, L. (2017). Greenwashing revisited: In search of a typology and accusation-based definition incorporating legitimacy strategies. Business Strategy and the Environment, 26(2), 239–252. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1912

Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010

Stein, J. C. (1989). Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 655–669. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937861

Stocken, P. C. (2000). Credibility of voluntary disclosure. The RAND Journal of Economics, 31(2), 359–374. https://doi.org/10.2307/2601045

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2024, March 18). SEC charges two investment advisers with making false and misleading statements about their use of artificial intelligence (Press Release No. 2024-36). URL: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-36

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2025, January 14). SEC charges restaurant-technology company Presto Automation for misleading statements about AI product (Securities Act Release No. 33-11352; Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-22413). URL: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/administrative-proceedings/33-11352-s

Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3