Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Privacy-Preserving Recognition of Cross-Institution Engineering Laboratory Competencies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63646/FSOM9215Keywords:
Zero-Knowledge Proofs, Engineering Education, Laboratory Competencies, Verifiable Credentials, Privacy-Preserving Recognition, Cross-Institution LearningAbstract
Engineering laboratory competencies are increasingly developed across universities, shared facilities, short courses, and industry partners, yet transferring proof of achievement can expose student identity, raw work, assessment records, and unrelated learning history. This article specifies a privacy-preserving protocol for recognizing cross-institution engineering laboratory competencies with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). An issuing institution signs a structured competency claim after its own assessment; a learner-controlled wallet later proves that the credential is authentic, current, and satisfies a receiving institution’s versioned requirement, while withholding the credential’s hidden attributes and the underlying evidence. The proposed architecture separates four decisions that are often conflated: cryptographic validity, issuer authorization, semantic equivalence of competencies, and educational judgment about assessment quality. A formal proof relation binds the issuer key, schema and mapping versions, verifier audience, fresh nonce, status epoch, and requested predicate. The design includes privacy-aware status checking, cross-credential holder binding, explicit failure states, human review and appeal, governance for outcome mappings, a threat model, and a synthetic laboratory scenario. It treats zero knowledge as a bounded disclosure mechanism: it can establish that signed claims satisfy a predicate, but cannot establish that an observation was honestly performed or that two institutions’ learning outcomes are pedagogically equivalent. No empirical deployment or performance result is claimed. The article concludes with an implementation profile, conformance tests, and an evaluation plan for pilot use in electrical, instrumentation, and manufacturing laboratories.How to Cite
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